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BANKRUPTCY
Company Filing Bankruptcy Must Have
Sufficient Time to Unwind Before Being Obligated
to Return Stock Stipulated in a Prior Sales Agreement
The United States Bankruptcy Court of Pennsylvania, held that
physicians who sold their shares in a professional corporation to a
Chapter 7 debtor did not have superior rights to that stock.'
Stock in plaintiff's professional corporation was sold to defendant
corporation by way of a Stock Agreement.2 Defendant subsequently
discovered state law prohibited business corporations from purchasing
stock in professional corporations.3 Defendant amended plaintiff s
articles of incorporation to form a business corporation in order to
make the stock purchase legal.4 The sale of the stock was contingent
upon defendant achieving an investment benchmark of $30,000,000 to
fund the consolidated practice group.5 Plaintiff further stipulated if the
investment benchmark could not be met by specified date, the sale
would be void, permitting the plaintiff to regain its stock.' Defendant
did not reach that benchmark and plaintiff requested the purchase
agreement be cancelled and the stock returned.7 However, when
defendant filed Chapter 11 bankruptcy thirty days later, stock had yet to
be returned to plaintiff.' At issue were the assets generated betveen the
period of time when plaintiff demanded return of the stock and when
the defendant filed bankruptcy, and which company was actually in
control during that time frame.9

'See In re U.S. Physicians, Inc., 238 B.R. 103, 111 (1999).
at 107.
See id
4
see id
'See id
6
See In re U.S. Physicians,Inc., 238 B.R. at 107.
7
See id at 108.
sSee id. at 105.
9
See id at 109.
2
See id
3
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The court cited a generally recognized principle of state law
requiring recovery of stock before control of the corporation can
occur.'" The court also stated, in order for plaintiff to recover stock,
defendant must be given enough time to complete the corporate
formality of unwinding, and one month, as was the case here, was not
sufficient time for defendant to complete the process." The court thus
held defendant had a greater interest in the proceeds generated in the
time frame between plaintiff demanding return of the stock and
defendant filing bankruptcy. 2 In re U.S. Physicians,Inc., 238 B.R. 103
(1999).

CONTRACT
When the Medical History of an Adoptive Baby
is Incomplete and Unknown, the Agency Will Not Be Held Liable
for Medical Problems

The Court of Appeals of Minnesota held that the agency was not liable
for breach of contract, violation of statute, negligent misrepresentation,
or intentional infliction of emotional distress when a prospective
adoptive baby died of sudden infant death syndrome (SIDS) and also
was found to be HIV positive. 3
Plaintiffs, prospective parents, began an adoption process of a
newborn baby girl through the defendant's adoption agency. 4 Shortly
after birth, the baby died of SIDS and was found to be HIV positive."
Plaintiffs filed for breach of adoptive contract against the adoption
agency, based on the fact that defendant knew or should have known of

'0Seeid. at I11.
"See Inre U.S. Physicians, Inc., 238 B.R. at 111.
12See id.
13See Montavon v. Wellspring Adoption Agency, 1999 W.L. 639306 at *1 (Minn.
App.
Aug. 24, 1999).
4

See id.

5

" See id.
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the child's HIV status prior to her release from the hospital. 6
Defendant filed a cross-motion for summary judgment that was granted
by the trial court and plaintiffs appealed. 7
The court was faced with four issues. The first issue was whether
the agency breached the contract by failing to disclose the medical
history of the baby and her mother."S Second, was whether the agency
violated the statute by failing to complete the medical history form. 9
Third, did the agency owe the prospective parents a legal duty.2'
Fourth, was the agency liable for intentional infliction of emotional
distress.21
The court held that the agency was not liable for breach of
contract, violation of statute, negligent misrepresentation, intentional
infliction of emotional distress, and did not owe the parents a legal
duty.' The court concluded that there was no evidence that the agency
was aware of any medical problems of the adoptive baby.' The court
articulated its belief that defendant agreed to provide the prospective
parents with a child with unavailable medical records.24 Furthermore,
there was no evidence that the birth mother was aware that she was
I[V positive, nor vas there evidence that the agency was untruthful in
its representation of the baby to the prospective parents,ZS Although the
defendant informed plaintiffs that the newborn baby girl was "healthy,"
there was nothing to indicate that defendant did not believe this to btrue. 26 Additionally, the court concluded that the hospital did not
exhibit any tortious conduct; therefore was not liable for intentional

'See ict
'7See id.
sSee Montavon, 1999 W.L. 639306 at *2.
9See id.
20
See id.
21
See id. at *3.
22See id.
23See Montavon, 1999 W.L. 639306 at *3.
24
See id.at * 1.
2'See ic at *2-3.
26
See id. at *2.
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infliction of emotional distress.27 Montavon v. Wellspring Adoption
Agency, 1999 WL 639306, *1(Minn. App. Aug. 24, 1999).

CRIME
Defendant's Act of Stealing Morphine from
Her Patients with Reckless Disregard and Extreme Indifference
Was Enough to Qualify as Tampering and
Prescription Fraud Under the Statute
The United States Court of Appeals, Eighth Circuit, held that
defendant's act of stealing morphine from her critically ill patients
violated the tampering statue, and that defendant's knowledge of her
patients' condition and suffering without the morphine was sufficient
for the mens rea requirements of extreme indifference and reckless
disregard.28
Defendant stole morphine from the morphine delivery devices of
patients under her care, and substituted it with saline solution. 9 She
was convicted of four counts of tampering with a consumer product and
six counts of obtaining a controlled substance through fraud3", and
sentenced to forty-eight months for each fraud count and seventy
months on each tampering count.3 ' She appealed arguing that the
tampering statute is inapplicable to her actions and that the lower court
erred in applying sentencing guidelines.
The court held that the government met all requirements of the
tampering statute:
and describes
(1) the term "tampers" is not ambiguous
32
adulteration;
product
of
activity
the
27

See id.
United States v. Moyer, 182 F.3d 1018 (8th Cir. 1999).
29
See id. at 1020.
28

3"See id.
3

See id. at 1023.
See id. at 1020-21.

32
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(2) the morphine in question was used in commerce,
since it was manufactured in and shipped from out of
state;

33

(3) defendant acted with reckless disregard and extreme
indifference by exposing her patients to 3serious
4
health risks and great pain through her actions;
could be causing
(4) defendant knew that her actions
35
patients;
her
for
health problems
Finally, the court held neither a downward or upward departure from
applicable sentencing guidelines was appropriate. By exposing her
patients to risk of death or serious bodily injury, defendant did not meet
the criteria for downward departure, and, because her shorter sentences
for fraud ran concurrent to those for tampering, any error the court
would have made in not departing upward was harmless error." United
States v. Moyer, 182 F.3d 1018 (8th Cir. 1999).

DAMAGES
Court's Discretion in Determining Periodic Payments
of Damages is Bound by the Jury's Determination
of the Gross Amount of Future Economic Damages,
Legislative Intent, and Actual Empirical Evidence
The California Court of Appeals held that, while it was the jury who
determined future economic damages or gross damages in a medical
malpractice case, it was the judge's sole discretion to set forth a
payment schedule upon the request of either party.37 Furthermore, the

33

See Moyer, 182 F. 3d at 1021.

34
See
35

id.
See id.

36

See id. at 1022-23.
Holt v. Regents of the Univ. of Cal., 86 Cal. Rptr. 2d 752, 759 (1999).

37
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judge must also look to the intent of the legislature and actual evidence
of the plaintiff s future damages.3
The patient suffered permanent brain damage at defendant's
hospital. 39 This event left her unable to live independently or finish
college and in need of life-long medical care.4" At the conclusion of the
trial, the jury gave plaintiff accrued noneconomic damages, future
medical expenses, future lost earnings, as well as determined the
present cash value of the future medical expenses and lost eamings.
Upon the defendant's request pursuant to Code Civ. Proc., § 667.7, the
trial court set a schedule of periodic payments of twenty equal annual
installments, with the total of future economic damages exceeding what
the jury had previously determined.42
The issue on appeal concerned the scope of the court's discretion
with respect to the jury's assessment of damages, limitations on
payment of lost earnings, equal installments of payments, and
calculating contingent attorney fees.43
First, the court held that, while the court had discretion to
determine the duration, frequency and amount of the periodic
payments, it must use the gross amount of future damages as set by the
jury.44 Furthermore, if a defendant wished to purchase an annuity to
fund the periodic payments it may do so, but it may not receive
immediate satisfaction ofjudgment.45
Second, with respect to medical payments, the trial court abused
its discretion as it disregarded evidence presented by the experts on
both sides, that plaintiffs medical expenses would be constant
throughout her life, and, instead, ordered payments to continue only for
forty-two years.46 On appeal, the court held that the lower court could
not disregard expert testimony and vary the duration of medical
8

See id. at 759-6 1.
See id. at 755.

9

40

See id.
4'See id.
42
See Holt, 86 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 756.
43
See id. at 752.

44See id. at 759.
45

See id.

46

See id. at 760.
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payments, since this would be detrimental to the plaintiff and leave her
without support for her medical needs for the last twenty years of her
47
life.
Third, and upon a similar argument, the court determined that the
lower court abused its discretion in setting a limit on plaintiff's wordng
life." The court held that, any discretion concerning the structure of the
periodic payment schedule must be exercised within the boundaries of
the evidence presented." If the lower court were allowed to limit the
duration for lost earnings, the plaintiff would, again, have been left
without support later in life.
Finally, the court determined that a lower court may calculate
attorney fees based upon the jury's finding of the present value of
future damages."0 Holt v. Regents of the Univ. of CaL, 86 CalRptr.2d
752 (1999).

DEFAMATION
Absolute Immunity in Trial Testimony Privilege
Bars Suit for Slander
The Court of Appeals of Texas held the absolute immunity privilege
granted witnesses for their testimony in judicial proceedings prohibited
a lawsuit for slander.5
Plaintiff alleged that in a prior medical malpractice suit, defendant
was called as an expert witness.52 Plaintiff contended defendant's
expert testimony contained lies and libelous statements about
plaintiff.53 These statements led to plaintiff's being ridiculed and

47 See

Holt, 86 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 760.
SSee id.
49
See id.
5
See id. at 762.
4

51

See Lombardo v. Traughber, 990 S.W.2d 958, 958 (Tex. App. 1999, no wit).
'2See id at 959.
"See id
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subject to public hatred.54 The trial court granted summary judgment in
favor of defendant, and plaintiff appealed that judgment. 5
The court affirmed the trial court's decision dismissing plaintiffs
action because defendant was protected by absolute immunity with
regard to his trial testimony.56 Regardless of the truth of defendant's
statements, he still had immunity in order to ensure a full and free
disclosure at trial." Lombardo v. Traughber, 990 S.W.2d 958 (Tex.
App. 1999, no writ).

DISCOVERY
Hospitals Not Required to Produce Unknown
Patient Information and Peer Review Materials to
Third Parties in Litigation
The Supreme Court of Michigan in a consolidation of two cases held
the Michigan physician-patient statute prohibited hospitals from
providing identification information about other patients. 8 Further, any
after-incident reports and other investigatory documents were peer
review materials and statutorily protected from discovery. 9 Finally,
plaintiffs failure to provide a notice of intent to sue and an affidavit of
merit warranted dismissal of plaintiffs malpractice claim."
In Dorrisv. Detroit OsteopathicHosp. Corp., plaintiff visited the
defendant hospital's emergency room complaining of nausea, vomiting,
and diarrhea and was administered a drug despite her warning medical
personnel of her drug allergy.6 Plaintiff experienced an allergic

54

See id.

55

See id.

56

See Lombardo, 990 S.W.2d 958, 960.
S7See id.
58See Dorris v. Detroit Osteopathic Hosp. Corp., 594 N.W. 2d 455, 462 (Mich. 1999).
'9See id. at 464.
60
See id. at 466.
6

'See id.
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reaction and subsequently filed suit for damages.6 2 Plaintiff sought to
compel defendant to release the name of plaintiffs roommate who was
witness to her protests regarding administration of the medication.'3
The district court granted plaintiff's request, but this decision was
reversed on appeal. Plaintiff appealed the decision of the appellate
6
court. 1

In Gregory v. Heritage Hosp., plaintiff was the victim of an
assault and battery by another patient in a hospital's psychiatric ward."
Plaintiff requested production of all investigative reports relating to the
incident, as well as the identity of the patient who assaulted her.67 The
district court granted plaintiffs motion to compel production, and
defendant's application for leave to appeal in the Court of Appeals was
denied.6' The Michigan Supreme Court granted defendant's application
for appeal and consolidated that case with Dorris."
The first issued addressed by the court was whether defendant
hospitals were required to provide identification information about
other unknown patients."
Michigan's physician-patient statute
protected the names of unknown patients from discovery because that
information was privileged. 7 This privilege inheres in the patient, and
a patient may voluntarily and intentionally, or impliedly waive it' n
Neither the patient in Dorris or Gregory voluntarily or impliedly
waived their confidentiality privilege.'
While Michigan permitted a
liberal discovery policy, the discovery of materials that were privileged

62

See id

63

See Dorris,594 N.W. 2d at 455.

64See
idat 455.
6
SSee id
See id

66
67

See id

6

'SSee Dorris,594 N.W. 2d at 459.

69

See id
See id

70
71

See id.

72See it at 462.
73See Dorris,594 N.W. 2d at 462.
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was prohibited.74 Since both patients' information was privileged, it
was not discoverable.
The second issue considered was whether the investigative
materials regarding plaintiffs assault and battery in Gregory was
discoverable.76 Under Michigan law, records and other information
gathered for the purpose of peer review is confidential information.77
Hospitals were required to create and maintain peer review committees
for the purpose of reducing morbidity and mortality, and to ensure a
high level of patient care.78 Protecting the confidentiality of such
information was important to ensuring open and honest discussions
among hospital staff.79 The reports requested in Gregory were used for
maintaining quality health care standards and reducing morbidity and
mortality in the hospital.8" The district court's order to compel
production was reversed and remanded to determine if the materials
requested in Gregory were protected from disclosure under Michigan
law.s '
The third issue addressed by the court was whether plaintiffs
claim in Gregory was a malpractice claim, and therefore subject to a
requirement of notice of intent to sue as well as an affidavit of merit.8"
Plaintiff argued that her claim was for ordinary negligence and not for
medical malpractice, and should not be subject to the notice
requirement.83 The test for determining whether a claim was for
medical malpractice rested on whether the issues raised were within the
common knowledge and experience of the jury, or, alternatively,
whether questions of medical judgment were raised. 4 The court held
that the average juror would not be familiar with the supervisory and
74

See id. at 46 1.
"5See id. at 462.
"6See id.
77
See id.
7Ssee Dorris,594 N.W. 2d at 463.
"'See id. at 463.
"°See id.
"1See id. at 464.
82
See id.
83
See Dorris,594 N.W. 2d at 464.
84
See id. at 465.
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staffing needs of a psychiatric ward." As such, plaintiff s claim was
for medical malpractice and therefore subject to the notice
requirement.16 Under Michigan law, the appropriate sanction for failure
to provide notice of intent to sue was dismissal of the complaint. The
court dismissed plaintiffs claim without prejudice.8 2 Dorrisv Detroit
OsteopathicHosp. Corp., 594 N. WV
2d 455 (Mich. 1999).

Co-Defendants Entitled to Evidence of Prior Acts and Omissions,
but Not Materials Prepared in Anticipation of Litigation
The Alabama Supreme Court held interviews and records prepared in
anticipation of litigation could be withheld from production to codefendants. 9 However, evidence of prior acts and omissions on the
part of a co-defendant could not be withheld from other codefendants. 0
In 1991, plaintiff underwent circumcision.9
During surgery,
defendant used a medical device known as an "electrosurgical unit" to
cauterize blood vessels that bled during surgery. " Following surgery,
plaintiff developed an infection that led to gangrene.' Ultimately,
three-fourths of plaintiff's penis had to be removed because of the
serious nature of the infection. 4 Plaintiff filed suit against his
physician as well as the manufacturers of the electrosurgical unit,
alleging medical malpractice as well as claims of product liability."
Co-defendant manufacturers sought discovery of physician's
insurer's investigative file on the incident, as well as discovery of
SSSee id at 466.
'6See id
s 7See id
SSSee Dorris,594 N.W. 2d at 466.
S9See Exparte Pfizer, Inc., 1999 WL 357415, at * I (Ala. June 4, 1999),
OaSee id
91
See id.

92See id
93

See id
See Pfizer, 1999 WL 357415, at * 1.
95
See id.
94
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physician's prior medical records for circumcisions.96 The trial court
initially ordered production of these records, but later vacated its order.
Defendants sought a writ of mandamus directing the circuit court to
vacate its latest rulings.97
The court held there was no abuse of discretion in denying
defendants' requests for the insurer's investigative file because that file
was prepared in anticipation of litigation.9" Defendants had sufficient
time to conduct similar discovery on their own without undue
hardship.99
Further, the court held defendants were entitled to the physician's
medical records for circumcisions because defendants and the physician
were all co-defendants in this action.'
State law prohibits plaintiffs
from seeking discovery of prior acts or omissions, but since defendants
were making the production request, that law did not apply.' Exparte
Pfizer, Inc., 1999 WL 357415, at *1 (Ala. June 4, 1999).

EMPLOYMENT CONTRACT
Employee Did Not Meet Requirement of Justifiable Reliance
in a Fraudulent Contract Action
The Supreme Court of Alabama held that an employee could not have
justifiably relied on alleged oral representations because the employee's
employment contract's language was plain and unambiguous.0
Plaintiff testified that a physician approached him about joining
his medical practice after plaintiff completed his residency. 3 Plaintiff
96

See id. at *2.

97

See

id. at *1.

93

See id. at *3.
99
See Pfizer, 1999 WL 357415, at *3.

'00See id.at *4.
10tSee id.
102See Bailey v. Rowan v. Bailey, Nos. 1971811 & 1971812, 1999 WL 722694, at *I
(Ala. Sept. 17, 1999).
'03See id.at * 1.
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agreed to the terms of an employment contract and commenced work as
an associate physician with the defendant employer.'"t Plaintiff became
dissatisfied and decided to quit after the first year of his contract
expired." 5 Plaintiff alleged the defendant employer had fraudulently
misrepresented that plaintiff would receive a bonus regardless of
contract renewal. 05 Plaintiff never received a bonus from defendant
employer." 7 Plaintiff also alleged that defendant employer fraudulently
induced plaintiff into signing employment contract by telling him that
revenue over $150,000 would be used for his bonus." 3 Plaintiff
subsequently filed suit against defendant for fraud and breach of
09
contract.1
Defendant employers filed a motion for a judgment as a matter of
law on the fraud and contract claims."' The trial court granted
judgment in favor of defendant on the breach-of-contract claims and
submitted the fraud claims to the jury."' The jury awarded plaintiff
damages on the fraud claims."
On appeal, the court considered whether plaintiff justifiably relied
on defendant's alleged misrepresentations."' In order to succeed on a
fraud or misrepresentation claim, a plaintiff must establish:
(1)
(2)

a false misrepresentation by the defendant concerning
an existing material fact,
a representation that
(a) the defendant knew was false when it was
made,
(b) was made recklessly and without regard to
its truth or falsity,

'04See id.
0
'O
See id.at *2.

'"5See id.
'07See Bailey, 1999 WL 722694, at *2.
...
See id.

"09See id
"0See id
" See id.
See Bailey, 1999 WL 722694, at *2.
'"See id

at *3.
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(c) was made by telling the plaintiff that the
defendant had knowledge that the
representation was true, when the
defendant did not have such knowledge;
reliance by the plaintiff on the representation,
that the plaintiffs reliance was reasonable under the
circumstances, and
damage proximately resulting from the plaintiffs
4
reliance."

The court held the defendants' motion should be granted because
the plaintiff employee failed to establish justifiable reliance on the
representations.'
The court held the language of the contract was
plain and unambiguous." 6 The contract provided that plaintiff had to
renew the employment contract for a second year in order to receive a
bonus and any modifications to the contract had to be in writing." 7
The court concluded plaintiff, who had the benefit of extensive
education, could only have failed to realize the contract terms by
closing his eyes to the truth."' Hence, the court reversed the decision
and remanded the case." 19 Bailey v. Rowan v. Bailey, Nos. 1971811 &
1971812, 1999 WL 722694, (Ala. Sept. 17, 1999).

'"See id.

" 5 See id.

" 6See id.
7
See Bailey, 1999 WL 722694, at *2.
"'See id. at *3. (citing Hurst v. Nichols Research Corp., 621 So. 2d 946, 969

(Ala. 1993)).
9

See id.
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ERISA
Individual May Show Up to Work Everyday

in Declining Health Prior to Termination
and Still Meet the Prerequisites of Total Disability Under ERISA

The United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit held it was
reasonable to conclude a former employee was totally disabled for the
purposes of Employment Retirement Income Security Act (ERISA)
before termination.'
Plaintiff was an employee of one of the defendants for over
twenty-two years.' 2 ' During the plaintiffs employment, he received
medical treatment for several serious illnesses, but maintained his
employment with the defendant.'2
However, plaintiff was
subsequently terminated as a result of his performance.' 2 3 After
termination, plaintiff filed a claim with employer's insurance for long
term disability benefits.2 4 The claim was denied on the basis plaintiff
was not completely disabled prior to termination, and failed to meet the
definition of disabled while still employed.S The defendants argued
plaintiff continued to show up for work and perform his duties on a day
to day basis, thus he could not satisfy the definition of disabled while
still employed.

26

The court held there was evidence from medical records, physician
testimony, and Social Security records, that established the plaintiffs
disability while still employed, and therefore, it could be concluded the
plaintiff was disabled while still employed and should therefore, be

20

Whatley v. CNA Ins. Co., 189F.3d 1310, 1313, 1315 (1lth Cir. 1999).
'2 See id. at 1312.
122See id
"ZSeeidL

124See id

'2See
Wlatley, 189 F.3d at 1313-1314.
26

1 See id.
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eligible for benefits under ERISA.'2 7 Whatley v. CNA Ins. Co., 189
F.3d 1310 (11th Cir. 1999).

HEALTH MAINTENANCE ORGANIZATION
Health Maintenance Organization Held Liable for the
Adverse Results of Its Actions
The Court of Appeals of California held a health plan negligently liable
for failing to refer plaintiff to a specialist.'23 The plaintiff patient
suffered from a progressive lung disease.'29 His health maintenance
organization (HMO) refused to refer him to a specialist for treatment
that rendered plaintiff unable to walk or stand without assistance and in
need of oxygen to breathe. 3 Plaintiff brought the action in state court
against his HMO and its physician for negligence, intentional and
negligent infliction of emotional distress, unfair business practices, and
fraud. 3 ' The trial court determined that all causes arose under the
Medicare Act and should have been filed in Federal court and
dismissed the complaint.'32
The issue presented to the court was whether the patient's claim
arose under the Medicare Act and if not, whether the HMO was
vicariously liable for the negligence of one of its members.'33 The court
held that the claim did not arise under the Medicare Act. 4 The court
concluded that claims, which did not seek reimbursement benefits, did
not arise under the Medicare Act and were actionable in state court. 3"
Although plaintiffs claim included damages of past and future medical
'27See id. at 1314-1315.
'28See McCall v. Pacificare of Cal., 97 Cal. Rptr. 2d 784, 788 (1999).
129See

id. at 785.

130See id.

131See id.
' 32See id.
33

1

See McCall, 97 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 785.

134See id.at 788.
'35See id.
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expenses, which were not recoverable in a state action, their presence in
the complaint did transform the action into a reimbursement case. "'
Furthermore, plaintiffs negligence, fraud, and emotional suffering
allegations do not arise under the Medicare Act. "7 The court further
held the HMO vicariously liable of the negligence of one of its
physicians.3S The court concluded that the HMO was a corporation
that provided medical care to patients and the physicians were
employees of that corporation.'39 Because of the structure of the
physician's association with the HMO, the HMO was a provider and
liable for the negligence of its employees. 4 McCall v. Pacificare of
Cal., 97 Cal. Rptr. 2d 784 (1999).

Commissioner Exceeded His Authority in Denying a Hospital's
Petition for a Certificate of Public Need by Claiming that
the State Medical Facilities Plan was Outdated and by
Reliance on Extra-record Evidence, When Hospital Met All
Criteria of the COPN Form
The Court of Appeals of Virginia held that the State Health
Commissioner (Commissioner) exceeded his authority in denying
plaintiff Hospital's application for a certificate of public need (COPN)
based on his contention that the State Medical Facilities Plan (SMFP)
" ' Furthermore, the court held that it was reversible error
was outdated.14
for the Commissioner to rely on extra-record evidence, which he
himself admitted was a mistake of fact.'42
The plaintiff applied for a COPN to be able to conduct liver
transplants.'43 The application satisfied all necessary criteria and the
36

' See id.
1

See id.

3

' See McCall, 97 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 789.

39

See id.
id.
' See Sentara Norfolk Gen. Hosp. v. State Health Comm'r, 30 Va. App. 20b7, 516
S.E.2d 690,
690 (Va. App. 1999).
142See id. at 694.
4
'See
41

143See id. at 692.
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East Virginia Health Systems Agency Board recommended its
approval.'44 The Department of Health's Division of Certificate of
Next
Public Need (DCOPN), however, denied the application) 4
followed another informal hearing, during the course of which the
presiding officer recommended approval once again. 46 The application
was then presented to the Commissioner, who rejected it on grounds
that empirical evidence showed the SMFP minimum transplant
requirement was already too low and outdated, and if plaintiff would
commence transplants, the transplants at surrounding facilities would
decline. 14
The issues before the court were (1) whether the Commissioner
acted within the scope4 of his authority and (2) whether his reliance on
evidence was proper.' 1
As to the first issue, the court found that the outdated or inaccurate
SMFP is not a basis for rejecting a COPN application.149 Secondly, the
evidence used by the Commissioner did not meet the necessary
substantial evidence standard and was insufficient to support his
With respect to evidence, the court rejected the
ruling.'50
Commissioner's contention that he had institutional knowledge,'"' and
that his erroneous conclusion substantially prejudiced the plaintiff."2
As a result, the court remanded the case and instructed the
Commissioner to accept plaintiffs COPN application.' 53 Sentara
Norfolk Gen. Hosp. v. State Health Comm'r, 30 Va. App. 267, 516
S.E.2d 690 (Va. App. 1999).

'44See id.
'45See id.
46
" See
47

Sentara,516 S.E.2d at 692.

1 See id. at

693.
148See id. at 694.
'49See id. at 695.
150See id. at 696.
...
8ee Sentara, 516 S.E.2d at 696.
"52See id. at 697.
53

' See id. at 698.
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IMMUNITY
Immunity Granted Under HCQIA,
Does Not Guarantee Attorney Fees,
Unreasonable Conduct is Still Necessary to Satisfy the Test
The United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit held
although defendant was granted immunity under the Health Care
Quality Improvement Act of 1986 (HCQIA), plaintiffs claims and
litigation conduct were not so unreasonable as to meet the purposes of
section 11113 of HCQIA for attorney's fees.'
Plaintiff was employed by the defendant hospital that restricted
Plaintiff
and ultimately terminated the plaintiff s staff privileges.'
then filed suit against defendant for violation of antitrust laws, breach
of contract and bad faith. 5 6 Defendant filed motion for summary
judgment on the basis of immunity under HCQIA, which was granted
and followed by a motion for attorney's fees." 7
The court first looked to the timeliness of defendant's motion for
fees."'S A motion for fees must be filed within fourteen days after entry
of judgment.'59 The defendant here filed its motion one day late.!('
There are certain factors that may be taken into consideration when
determining whether or not an untimely motion may be addressed."'
The court decided the most important factors to be considered here
were (1) the possible prejudice to plaintift, (2) length of delay and its
possible impact upon judicial proceedings, (3) reason for delay, and (4)
did defendant act in good faith." The court determined plaintiff was
154See Sugarbaker, M.D. v. SSM Health Care, 137 F.3d 853, 357 (Sth Cir. 1999),
"5 See id at 855.
56

See idL

" 7 See id

ISSSee id
'59See Sugarbaker, 187 F.3d at S55.
160See id
161See id at 856.
'62See id
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not prejudiced, the one-day delay did not adversely effect the judicial
process, and finally there
was no reason to believe the defendant was
63
faith.
good
in
acting
not
The court next determined HCQIA allowed for fee shifting, only
(1) when immunity standard was met and (2) where plaintiffs conduct
during litigation was unreasonable.'64 The court held although
defendant was entitled to immunity under HCQIA, fee shifting should
not be implemented since plaintiffs litigation conduct was not
unreasonable or frivolous. 65 Sugarbaker, M.D. v. SSM Health Care,
187 F.3d 853 (1999).

INSURANCE
Patients Need Not Exhaust Insurance Company's Administrative
Claims Process if Doing so Would be Frivolous
The United States District Court of New York held plaintiffs were not
required to exhaust the administrative claims process of the defendant
insurance company before filing suit since exhaustion would be
166

frivolous.

Plaintiffs in this case were all men who had insurance policies
through the defendant insurance companies and had been prescribed
Viagra pills by their doctors for their medical conditions.'67 Defendants
stopped paying for Viagra and announced it would pay for only six pills
per month regardless of the prescription quantity.'6 Plaintiffs all made
numerous calls to the defendants with no success.' 69 On every occasion
plaintiffs were told there were no exceptions to the policy of six Viagra
163See id.
'6See Sugarbaker, 187 F.3d at 856.

165See id. at 857.

166See Sibley-Schreiber v. Oxford Health Plans (N.Y.), Inc., 62 F. Supp.2d 979, 979
(E.D.N.Y.
1999).
'67See id. at 981, 983.

168See id. at 981.
169See id. at 981, 983.
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pills per month. 7 ' The plaintiffs then filed suit against defendants."'
The defendants argued plaintiffs did not exhaust the administrative
claims process and therefore, should not be allowed to file suit."
There was no statutory requirement of exhaustion before being
able to file suit, however courts have relied upon the idea claimants
should follow the internal procedures and exhaust internal plan
remedies before looking for judicial relief.'
The court stated
7
exhaustion was not always required. 7 Exhaustion was not required in
cases were it would be futile.'"7 In order for exhaustion to be futile, the
plaintiff must show it was certain their claim would be denied.17 In
this case, the court determined, plaintiffs numerous phone calls, letters,
and even physician letters, did little good, and never invoked the fact
plaintiffs could appeal.'7
For these reasons, the court held the
plaintiffs' exhaustion of the defendant's administrative process would
be futile and unnecessary. 17 Sibley-Schreiber v. Orford Health Plans
(NY.), Inc., 62F.Supp.2d 979 (E.D.N.Y. 1999).

MALPRACTICE
Physician Does Not Have an Obligation to Inform a Patient
of Possible Lethal Results of a Drug When Administered
Negligently, Unless Necessary to Rule Out Illness
that Could Be Caused By Negligent Administering of Drug
The Superior Court of New Jersey Appellate Division held while
defendant physician may not have had the duty to disclose the lethality
' 70 See i&

171See Sibley-Schreiber 62 F. Supp.2d at 981.
'72See id

'7'See id at 985.
' 74See id at 985, 986.

75
T'
See id176See Sibley-Schreiber., 62 F. Supp.2d at 986.
77
See i d at 987.
178See id. at 988.
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of the drug that killed plaintiffs husband from the start of the
treatment, he should have disclosed this when he learned the deceased
was ill after his treatment in order to rule out possible sources of his
illness. 9
Defendant physician prescribed colchicine therapy for the
The
plaintiffs husband, in order to treat his multiple sclerosis.'
plaintiff and the deceased lived some miles from the defendant's office,
and therefore had the injections done by a physician close to their
The drug itself was deadly in a greater than recommended
home.'
doses, however the amount prescribed by the defendant was enough to
help symptoms of the deceased's illness.'82 In April of 1993 the
plaintiff and deceased informed defendant of difficulties in obtaining
the drug.'83 Defendant then instructed a different pharmacy to prepare a
batch of the drug; however, this batch was four times greater than the
old concentration. 8 4 Included with the new batch of the drug was a
letter from the pharmacist stating the batch was four times greater and
indicating the new dosage for the deceased. 8 On April 10, 1993, the
deceased went to his regular doctor's office to receive his weekly
injection, but without his knowledge, he was given the old dosage
amount.' 6 Hours later, the deceased began to feel ill."'S The next day,
the deceased stopped breathing and was pronounced dead, with the
cause of death being multi-organ failure from an overdose of
colchicine. 88
Plaintiff argued defendant had a duty to inform her and her
husband of the lethal nature of colchicine if negligently administered."'
In order to prove negligence based on lack of informed consent,
179See Gilmartin v. Weinreb, M.D., 735 A.2d 620, 632-633 (N.J. Super. 1999).
"80See id. at 622.

181See id.
l832See id.
1

See id.

84

'" See Gilmartin,735 A.2d at 622.

...
See id.
lS6See id.
'See id.

...
See id.
'89See Gilmartin, 735 A.2d at 632.
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plaintiff must establish (1) the risk of injury would have influenced the
deceased's decision to undergo treatment, and (2) causation.'
The
court rejected this theory because a physician does not have a duty to
inform of risks not inherent in the procedure. 9 ' However, the court
determined defendant may have had a duty to inform plaintiff of the
lethal nature of the drug once he learned deceased became ill after his
treatment, this issue, however, was remanded for determination by the
92
court in a new trial'
In addition, plaintiff contended the jury should not have been
instructed on the defendant's exercise of judgment. 9 The court held
this contention was without merit due to the fact plaintiff accused
defendant of misdiagnosis of the deceased and diagnosis is a matter of
94
judgment.1
The court reversed the trial courts finding for the defendant and
remanded the case for a new trial based on its decision that physician
had a duty to disclose the lethal nature of a drug when it is necessary to
rule out possible causes of an illness. 9 Gilmartin v. Weinreb, M.D.,
735 A.2d 620 (NJ.Super. 1999).

Medical Group Training Physicians Has a Duty to Supervise
The Court of Appeals of Tennessee held defendant hospital was
responsible for the supervision of the operating physicians working out
of the hospital.'96
Plaintiff claimed physician group was liable for negligently
performing a tubal ligation.'97 Plaintiff filed suit not only against
physicians who performed the procedure but also the medical group the
"'Seeid
'91See id at 625.
'92See id at 632.
'93See id at 627.
'4See Gilmartin,735 A.2d at 632.
'95See id at 633.
'95See Davis v. University Phys. Found., Inc., No. 02A01-9S12-CV-00346, 1999 WL
643388, at *1 (Tenn. Ct. App. Aug. 24, 1999).
'97See id at * 1.
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physicians belonged to. 9 ' Plaintiff alleged the defendant medical
group was guilty of negligently supervising the physicians.'99 The
medical group while not the physicians' employer did have the
physicians working for training purposes."' Because physicians were
working out of the defendant's hospital and the fact that the medical
group sent a bill to the plaintiff, plaintiff alleged physicians were
servants of the defendant and therefore, defendant had an obligation to
supervise.2"'
The court stated unless there was a reason to believe the treating
physician was an independent contractor, a patient would believe the
medical group was liable for a physician's actions.2" 2 A master/servant
relationship depends upon the amount of control by the master over the
work done by the servant.2 3 Since the defendant functioned as "the
clinical arm that carried out the delivery of patient care," and billed
patients for the services, it had a duty to supervise the actions of
physicians, even those in training in its facility.2" 4
The court reversed the trial court's decision and held there was a
duty on the part of the defendant to supervise training physicians in its
facility. 205 Davis v. University Phys. Found., Inc., No. 02AO1-9812-CV00346, 1999 WL 643388, at *1(Tenn. Ct. App. Aug. 24 1999).

NEGLIGENCE
Evidence of Medical Personnel's Routine Habits Not Admissible
The Supreme Court of Virginia held the habit evidence of medical
personnel was not admissible to prove that a patient did not complain
' 98See id.

'99See
2 00

id.at *3.
See id.at * 1.
21'See Davis, 1999 WL 643388 at *2-*3.
202
See id.at *3.
203
See id. at *4.
2
°4See
id.at *5.
2
OSSee id.at *6.
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of pain on a specific occasion and defendant physician's treatment of
patient conformed to routine standard of care. "
Patient experienced tightness and pain in her chest during a
cardiac stress test.20 7

Patient complained to her daughter about

difficulty breathing and pains in her chest and arm following the test.2 3
Defendant physician told patient's daughter that the reaction was
normal and would resolve with resL2 9 That night, patient subsequently
died in her sleep as a result of heart failure.21 The patient's estate filed
a wrongful death action, alleging the physician was negligent in failing
to diagnose and treat the patient's heart condition."'
Defendant physician testified that he did not recall patient's
condition following the procedure. 12 Therefore, the physician admitted
evidence of his routine or habit in responding to other patients who had
similar complaints following a stress test to establish his conduct Vith
regard to the plaintiff patient.213 The habit evidence revealed that the
physician routinely re-evaluated a patient who complained of chest
pains following a stress test.1 4 The evidence was used to show that a
particular event, patient's complaint of chest pain, did not occur.21 The
lower court allowed the admission of defendant's habit evidence and
entered judgment in favor of defendant in accordance with jury's
verdict.

216

On appeal, the issue was whether evidence of medical personnel's
habitual conduct should have been admitted for the purpose of proving
the defendants' conduct on a specific occasion conformed to their

2

0SSee Ligon v. Southside Cardiology Assoc., P.C., No. 982467, 1999 WIL 731427, at *I

(Va. Sept.
17, 1999).
207
See id.
2
.See id
209
See id at *2.
21
See id at * 1.
21
'See Ligon, 1999 WL 731427, at *1.
2 12
See id at *2.
23

' See idt
id

24
' See
215

See id. at *2-3.

216

See Ligon, 1999 VL 731427, at *2.
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routine practice. 2 7 Here, evidence was not of general habit, rather
evidence related to specific responses to a specific situation.2"'
The court held evidence of habitual conduct that consisted only of
collateral facts did not allow any fair inferences to be drawn.219
Evidence of habitual conduct was inadmissible to prove conduct at the
time of the incident complained of because such evidence was
collateral to the issues at trial.22 ° The court also held that this evidence
tended to mislead the jury and to divert its attention from important
" '
issues.22
The court held that the relevant inquiry in a negligence action was
not whether a defendant had a habit of compliance with the type of duty
at issue, but whether the defendant breached a specific duty owed to the
plaintiff at a particular time.222 Hence, the court reversed the earlier
decision and remanded the case.223 Ligon v. Southside Cardiology
Assoc., P.C., No. 982467, 1999 WL 731427, at *1 (Va. Sept. 17, 1999).

Physician and Two Attending Nurses Liable for
Death of Patient During Hysteroscopy Under
the Doctrine of Alternative Liability,
Even Though it was Not Certain Who Caused the Injury
The Supreme Court of New Jersey held that under the negligence
doctrine of alternative liability, physician and nurses present during a
hysteroscopy could all be liable for the patient's death when it was
224
clear one or more of them were at fault, but it was uncertain who.
The patient died from an air embolism as a result of an incorrectly
connected hysteroscope during a common procedure. 25 The exhaust
2 7

' See id. at *4.
'See id.

21

219

See id. at *3.
See id.
221
See Ligon, 1999 WL 731427 at *3.
222See id. at *4.
22'See id. at *5.
22 4See Estate of Chin by Chin v. St. Barnabas Med. Ctr., 734 A.2d 778, 778 (N.J. 1999).
225See id.at 459.
22 0
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tube of the apparatus used during the procedure was hooked-up
incorrectly with the result that nitrogen gas was pumped into the
patient's uterus causing the fatal embolism.2 6 The pump arrived from
the manufacturer undamaged but was negligently assembled during the
procedure by three nurses and an attending physician present." 7
Immediately following the fatal accident, the apparatus was
disconnected, making it impossible to determine precisely which tubes
were incorrectly connected.S
The first issue before the court was whether the burden of proof
shifted to the defendants? 9 The court determined that the three prong
rule set out in Anderson v. Somber? 0 was controlling in this ease:
(1) the plaintiff must be entirely blameless;
(2) the injury must imply negligence on the part of one
or more defendants;
(3) all potential defendants must be parties to the suit. t
The court found that plaintiff met all three requirements and that
the burden2 of proof was on the defendants to show that they were not
negligent. 32
Next, the court considered whether the jury may use the doctrine
of common knowledge or a professional standard of care to determine
negligence. 23 The court held that while medical malpractice cases use
a medical standard of care, it is appropriate to use the common
knowledge standard in unusual cases." 4 The court held that, because
the circumstances of the present case are clear and do not require expert
evidence, the common knowledge standard is appropriate."5
2'6 See id. at 46 1.
227See id. at 467.
"-See id. at 468.
229See Chin, 734 A.2d at 460.
23See Anderson v. Sornberg, 338 A.2d I (N.J. 1975).
231See Chin, 734 A.2d at 465.
232See id. at 465-66.
23 See id. at 460.

2'4See id. at 469.
2
SSee id. at 470-71.
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As a result, the court found that the defendants did not meet their
burden to show they were not negligent, and remanded the case to enter
the original jury verdict for the plaintiff.2 36 Estate of Chin by Chin v. St.
BarnabasMed. Cr., 734 A.2d 778 (N.J.1999).
Visitor Had Comparative Fault in Injury
The Court of Appeal of Louisiana reversed plaintiffs partial summary
judgment on liability because of questions as to whether plaintiff visitor
had any comparative fault in accident.237
Plaintiff testified that she was aware of the employee's normal
routine for delivery of food trays.238 Plaintiff visited the nursing home
daily to assist in the care and feeding of her husband, a patient at the
nursing home. 3 9 Plaintiff would meet the employee with the food cart
before it reached her husband's room in order to retrieve a tray early
and have more time to feed her husband.24
Plaintiff brought a
negligence action against the defendant nursing home and its insurer
after being injured by a food cart pushed by defendant's employee.24'
Plaintiff sought partial summary judgment on finding that defendants
were solely liable for the accident.242 The lower court granted
plaintiff's partial summary judgment on liability.243
The issue before the court was whether a genuine issue of material
fact was present, thereby precluding the summary judgment.244 The
court held the partial summary judgment should be reversed because
evidence showed that plaintiff placed herself directly in the food cart's

236

See Chin, 734 A.2d at 472.
'"See Allen v. Integrated Health Serv., Inc.,
Sept. 22, 1999).

228 See id.
19See id.
240

See id.

241
See
242

id.
See Allen, 1999 WL 735852, at *1.

243

See id.

244See id.at *2.

1999 WL 735852, at *1 (La. Ct. App,
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blindspot.45 Plaintiff admitted that it was not the employee vho
strayed from the normal routine on the day of the accident, rather it was
the plaintiff herself who failed to follow her normal routine of meeting
employee at particular place in hallway.24
The court held that
reasonable minds would differ in apportionment of fault under these
circumstances.247 Hence, the court reversed the summary judgment and
remanded the case.24s Allen v. IntegratedHealth Serv., Inc., No. 32,
196-CA, 1999 WL 735852, at *1 (Laa Ct.App. 2 Cir.Sept. 22, 1999).

PROCEDURE
When a Triable Issue of Fact Exists as to Whether or Not
an Addiction Problem Prevents an Addict
from Resuming His Former Occupation,
Summary Judgment Will Be Denied
The United States District Court for the Southern District of New York
held that a triable issue of fact was present and therefore denied the
granting of summary judgment.249
The plaintiff anesthesiologist, who had a history of addition to
Demerol, diverted narcotics originally issued by the hospital pharmacy
for his patients, for his own use. s ° He frequently self-administered
narcotics on days that he also administered anesthesia to hospitalized
patients." After the hospital began to suspect plaintiff of taking the
medication, he voluntarily surrendered his license and entered into a
rehabilitation facility. 2 Believing that he was incapable of returning to
24

See id.

246

See id.

247

See Allen, 1999 WL 735852, at *3.

245

See id

249

See Holzer v. M.L.B. Life Assurance Corp.,1999 WL 649004, at *1 (S.D.N.Y. Aug.
25, 1999).

'20See id at *1.
23 2See id. at *3.
2zSee id.
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work because he would be forced to administer to patients the same
drugs that he formerly abused, plaintiff sought disability benefits. 3
The insurance company refused to acknowledge that the addiction fell
within the meaning of their disability terms.2 4 To be deemed
"disabled," an individual must be unable to engage in his former
occupation because of sickness or injury. 5
The issue addressed by the court was whether the plaintiff's
chemical dependency prevented him from returning to his former
occupation. 216 The court found that a triable issue of fact was present
and denied summary judgment. 257 The court held while there was no
inherent reason why addicts could not resume their occupation, the fact
that plaintiff was advised not to return to work until he was reevaluated
by the clinic presented an issue of fact, therefore, summary judgment
could not be granted."' Holzer v. M.L.B. Life Assurance Corp., 1999
WL 649004, at *1 (S.D.N.YAug. 25, 1999).

Any Motion for Summary Judgment Must be in Accordance
with Rules of Civil Procedure
The Court of Appeals of Tennessee vacated the lower court's ruling and
remanded the case to the trial court for further proceedings." 9 The
plaintiff employee was covered by a health insurance plan under her
employers' parent company.26 The parent company failed to make the
insurance payment, thereby causing the policy to lapse. 261 The
employee, unaware that she was not covered, incurred thousands of

2

53See id.

254

See Holzer, 1999 WL 649004, at *3-4.
See id. at *3.

255

256

See id.
See id. at *6.

257

25 8

See id.
5 See Seals v. Tri-State Defender, Inc., 1999 WL 628074 at * 1, *3 (Tenn. Ct. App.
Aug. 16, 1999).
26
°See id. at * 1.
2 9

26 1

see id.
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dollars in medical bills.262 Because of the lapse, the employer promised
to pay for all the employee's medical bills."'3 Before the medical bills
were paid off, however, the employee was sued by her medical
providers. 2' After the complaint was filed, the employer paid the
balance of the employee's outstanding medical bills and reinstated her
The employee sought damages for negligent
health plan.
misrepresentation, fraudulent misrepresentation, and breach of contract,
seeking both compensatory and punitive damages."' The employer
filed a motion for summary judgment, which was granted by the trial
266

court.

The issue facing the court of appeals was whether the case should
be remanded for further proceedings based on the trial court's ruling
that plaintiff did not suffer any damages. 67 State Rules of Civil
Procedure stated any motion for summary judgement must be
accompanied by a separate and concise statement of the material facts
as to which the moving party contends no genuine issue of material fact
exist. 26s The opposing party must then respond to each fact set forth by
the movant.269 The court vacated the trial court's order for summary
judgment and remanded the case for further proceedings. m
The court reasoned that although defendant filed its motion for
summary judgment and gave a prayer for dismissal of the claims, it
failed to argue each claim. The court further concluded that complaint
alleged more than one claim and the trial court failed to rule on each
claim and, therefore, a final judgment had not been issued. 2 ' Seals v.
Tri-State Defender, Inc., No. 02AO1-9806-CH0172, 1999 WL 620874,
at *1 (Tenn. Ct. App. Aug. 16, 1999).

262

See id.

2
6'See id.
264

See Seals, 1999 WL 628074, at * 1.

26

See id.

26

'See id.

267

See id. at *2.
id.
See Seals, 1999 WL 628074, at *2.

26
SSee
269

27 0

See iL.

271

See ia
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REFUSAL OF TREATMENT
To Obtain Order to Forcibly Medicate a Patient, the Applicant
Need Only Show that Medication is in the
Patient's Best Interest and the Patient Lacks Consent
The Court of Appeals of Ohio held that an applicant was only required
to show that an individual as an involuntarily committed patient, lacked
capacity and that refused medication was in the person's best interest.27
The plaintiff patient was involuntarily committed into a
When the plaintiff refused to take his
psychiatric hospital.273
psychotropic medications, the County Mental Health Board (Board)
petitioned the court to authorize the forced medication of the drugs.274
The trial court denied the Board's application holding that the Board
failed to show that plaintiff was a danger to himself within the
institution. 75
The issue presented to the court was whether an applicant was
required to show dangerousness, in addition to lack of capacity and a
benefit of the medication. 6 The court held that an applicant need not
prove dangerousness in their request to have a patient forcibly
medicated.277 The court first concluded that commitment related to a
patient's dangerousness, not his competence to make decisions, and in
the absence of a showing of incompetence, a patient could be forced to
undergo treatment.278 The court defined incompetence as "any person
who was so mentally ill as a result of a mental or physical illness or
disability.. .that the person is incapable of taking proper care of the

272

See Hamilton Co. Comm. Mental Health Bd. v. Steele, No. C-980965, 1999 WL

632925,
at *1 (Ist Cir. Aug. 25, 1999).
27
3

274

See id.
See id.

27 5

See id.

2 76

See id. at *2.
77See Hamilton, 1999 WL 632925, at *2.

2

27 8

See id.
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person's self."279 In holding that dangerousness was not a condition for
application, the court held that if a guardian (even if one has not yet
been appointed) believed that the medication was in the best interest, no
other showing was necessary. 210 The court concluded, however, that
even if dangerousness was a requirement, the fact that a patient was
involuntarily committed was evidence of his or her dangerousness2r '
Hamilton County Community Mental Health Bd. v. Steel, No. C980965, 1999 WL 632925, at *1 (1st Cir.Aug. 25, 1999).

REIMBURSEMENT
Pharmacists Have a Private Right of Enforcement for Ensuring
Minimum Payments from Managed Care Providers
The Commonwealth Court of Pennsylvania held that pharmacists are
entitled to certain minimum reimbursement rates sufficient to ensure a
federally mandated standard of care is maintained..2 ' However, since
the court lacked original jurisdiction, the case was dismissed pending
further administrative proceedings.
Plaintiffs consisted of the state pharmacists' association and
several individual pharmacies who challenged the validity of outpatient
pharmacy rates under a managed-care program.283 Plaintiffs sought a
declaration that the Pennsylvania Department of Public Works (DPW)
be enjoined from providing further reimbursement to providers under
the managed-care program and to direct DPW to reimburse providers at
an earlier-established rate. 284 The reimbursement rate contended by
plaintiffs fell below the cost that pharmacies had to pay for

279

See id.

"See id.
28'See id.
"nSee Pennsylvania Pharm. Ass'n v. Commonwealth Dep't of Pub. Welfare, 733 A2d
666, 666 (Pa. Conmw. Ct. 1999).
2 3
" See id at 668.

28See ide

DEPAUL JOURNAL OF HEALTH CARE LAW

[Vol. 3:335

medication.2 5 As a result of this reimbursement rate, hundreds of
private pharmacies had closed, and thirty-five percent of pharmacies
originally in the program had dropped out.286 Plaintiffs further contend
this had resulted in a situation that impacted the efficiency and quality
of care provided to the plan's beneficiaries in violation of federal law.2 17
The court held payments made under a state medical assistance
program had to meet federal guidelines for efficiency and quality of
care.288 DPW's objection that plaintiffs were not statutorily entitled to a
minimum reimbursement rate failed because it was contrary to federal
law.

28 9

The court further held that plaintiffs had the right to challenge
DPW's administration of the managed-care waiver.290 Statutorily,
plaintiffs were entitled to a private cause of action in enforcement.291
Finally, the court ruled that it did not have original jurisdiction
over this matter because plaintiffs had not exhausted all their
administrative remedies.292 In answer to petitioners' concerns that
delay in the administrative process could cause irreparable harm, the
court ordered that administrative review be conducted in an expedited
manner.2 93 Pennsylvania Pharm. Ass'n v. Commonwealth Dep't of
Pub. Welfare, 733 A.2d 673 (Pa.Commw. Ct. 1999).

23

SSee id. at 669.
' See id.
287
See PennsylvaniaPharm.Ass 'n, 733 A.2d at 669.
288
See id. at 670.
29
S See id.
290
See id. at 67 1.
291
See id.
292
See PennsylvaniaPharm.Ass'n, 733 A.2d at 673.
293
See id.
2 6
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RIGHT TO DIE
Physician Incurred no Liability for Refusing to Withdraw
Life-Sustaining Treatment
The California Court of Appeals held a physician who refused to
withdraw life-sustaining treatment against the patient's family's wishes,
and in absence of the patient's advanced directives, had no civil
liability for his actions.294
In 1991, patient was in an automobile accident."' 5 When admitted
to the hospital she was comatose and was immediately placed on a
respirator.296 After conducting tests, patient's neurologist informed the
family that patient would never recover her ability to think and function
like a human being.297 Within the first few days of her hospitalization,
patient's family sought to have the respirator removed, believing that
this was what patient would have wanted. 293
Family members approached patient's physician and asked that the
respirator be removed, but physician refused to do so unless the patient
was brain dead or the family obtained a court order."' The family
retained counsel who negotiated an agreement with the hospital in
which the family would release the health care providers from any

liability if the respirator was removed. " ' Patient's physician refused to
sign the agreement.3"' Within two weeks, patient was declared brain
dead. 0 2

Patient's family filed suit against the health care providers for
professional negligence and negligent and intentional infliction of
2'See Duarte v.
295

Chino Community Hosp., 72 Cal. App. 4th 849, 849 (1999).

See idL at 851.
29'See idJ
297
See id.
2 3
SSee id.
2 9
' See Duarte,72 Cal. App. 4th at 853.
3
.See id at 852.
30 1
See ide
30

2See id
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emotional distress. 30 3 At trial, the jury found that none of the
defendants had been negligent, and the physician's conduct was not
sufficiently outrageous to warrant liability for intentional infliction of
emotional distress.0 4 Patient's family appealed, claiming the trial court
erred by not instructing the jury about a physician's duty of care when
faced with the withdrawal of life support systems.30 5
The court held that the trial court did not err in refusing to give
this instruction.30 6 Plaintiffs only sought damages.30 7 Under California
law, a physician has no civil liability for refusing to withdraw lifesustaining services.08 Since the physician was immune from liability
for damages, the trial court was not in error for refusing to give the jury
instruction.30 9
The court further held that a physician's immunity from
prosecution was not limited to treatment that a patient expressly
consented to. 310 The fact that neither the patient nor her family
consented to placing the patient on a ventilator had no effect on the
physician's immunity.3

Finally, the court held that the physician's statutory immunity was
not contrary to California's Natural Death Act.312 The patient had
313
executed no advanced directives to cover a situation such as this.
The Natural Death Act does not hold a physician liable unless the
patient had executed advanced directives. 3 4 As a result, the physician's
actions were not in violation of the Natural Death Act.31 5 Duarte v.
Chino Community Hosp., 72 Cal. App. 4th 849 (1999).
303

See id. at 849, 853.
3°4See Duarte, 72 Cal. App. 4th at 853.
30
See id.
36
" See id.
307
See id.
308
See id. at 854.
309
See Duarte, 72 Cal. App. 4th at 856.
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See id.
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STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS
When New Legislation Does Not Provide a
Reasonable Time Frame to Preserve Rights,
it Will Not be Applied Retroactively
The Circuit Court of Louisiana held that the statute, in the interest of
justice, could not be applied retroactively, and was therefore not barred
by the statute of limitations."1 6
The plaintiff was involved in an accident and underwent surgery
for a ruptured spleen. 7 In the course of the surgery, he was given
several units of blood infected with the hepatitis virus."' Almost a year
after plaintiff became aware of his illness, he contact an attorney, who
immediately mailed a petition to the Fund Oversight Board (PCF)
requesting a medical review panel.3 19 State statute (La. RIS.
40:12999.47 (A)(2)) was amended in July 1997, whereby all medical
malpractice claims were to be filed with the Division of
Administration, instead of the PCF.320
The amended statute caused plaintiff's claim to be barred by the
statute of limitations. The initial petition was returned to plaintiff's
attorney and he was then informed that the petition should be directed
to the Division of Administration. 21 Plaintiffs attorney re-submitted
the petition on October 8, 1997; however, the one-year statute of
limitations ended on September 30, 1997." The lower court held that
Plaintiff's claim was barred by the statute of limitations."3

316

See Davis v. Willis-Knighton Med. Ctr., 738 So. 2d 1191, 1194 (2d Cir. 1999).
See idat 1191.
3
1ISSee id. at 1192.
31

319

See id.

32 0

See id.
See Davis, 738 So. 2d at 1192.
3
22See id.
323See id.
321
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The first issue the court was faced with was determining the
effective date of the amended statute. 324 The second issue faced by the
court was whether the statute should be applied prospectively or
retroactively.325 The court first determined that the statute took effect
on August 15, 1997.326 The court further held that the statute could not,
in the interest of justice be applied retroactively.3 7 In deciding the
issue, the court concluded that the new provision lacked a reasonable
period of time for plaintiff to secure his rights under the law that
existed when his cause of action arose. 32 ' The court further reasoned
that Due Process guaranteed plaintiff a reasonable time frame during
which he should have been able to preserve his vested rights by filing
his claim with the Division of Administration rather than the PCF.329
The court, in a dissenting opinion, articulated its belief that
plaintiff was not stripped of any vested right.33° The dissenting judge
argued that the legislature merely instituted a procedural change and
ignorance should not prevent the running of prescriptions. 3 ' Davis v.
Willis-Knighton Med. COr., 738 So. 2d 1191 (2dCir. 1999.)

324

See id. at 1193.

325See id.
326See Davis, 738 So. 2d at 1194.
327See id. at 1194.
328
See id. at 1193
329See id. at 1194.
33
See id.
33'See Davis, 738 So. 2d at 1191.
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STRICT LIABILITY
Patient May Bring a Cause of Action in Strict Tort Liability
for Illness Received Through Tainted Blood Received
During a Blood Transfusion
Court of Appeal of Louisiana, Fifth Circuit, held that the plaintiff could
bring a cause of action in tort when the defendant hospital gave him
blood contaminated with Hepatitis C during a transfusion. 32
Plaintiff was diagnosed with Hepatitis C in September of 1995. "
He was told that the illness was probably a result of a contaminated
blood he received during two transfusions, one in 1981 and another in
1982."' 4 Plaintiff brought an action against the hospital in tort, since his
three-year statute of limitations for medical malpractice had already
expired.335
Prior to 1981, Louisiana held tainted blood to be a strict liability in
tort under Civil Code article 2315.6 After 1981, Civil Code article
2322.1 and LSA-R.S. 9:2797 extended immunity from strict tort
liability with respect to blood transfusions. 37 This law, however, was
found unconstitutional and invalid until the time of its amendment in
July of 1982.33s Because plaintiff's claim fell within the time period,
during which the law was unconstitutional, the court held that
defendants do not have exception of prescription (i.e., immunity), and,
therefore, plaintiff may bring a case in strict tort liability with the
applicable statute of limitation of one year from the time plaintiff
knows or should have known of the injury.3 39 Boutte v. Jefferson
ParishHosp. Serv. Dist.No. 1, 738 So. 2d 1188 (La. App. 1999).
332

See Boutte v. Jefferson Parish Hosp. Serv. Dist. No. 1. 733 So. 2d 1133 (La. App.

1999).
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See id. at 1189.
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TESTING
Licensee's Refusal of Chemical Testing was Reasonable
The Commonwealth Court of Pennsylvania held licensee's refusal to
leave child with police while licensee had blood testing at hospital was
reasonable; therefore, an appeal regarding suspension of licensing
privilege should not have been denied.34
Licensee testified that she failed two field sobriety tests and was
"'
arrested for driving under the influence.34
A police officer told
licensee about the informed consent law and asked licensee to submit to
a blood test at a hospital. 42 Licensee agreed to go to a hospital until
she was informed that her four-year old daughter could not go with
her.343 Licensee and her daughter were transported to a police station44
where an officer recorded licensee's refusal to submit to a test3
Defendant state Department of Transportation suspended licensee's
driving privileges for one year for refusal to submit to chemical
testing. 345 Licensee subsequently filed an appeal. 346 The trial court
denied licensee's statutory appeal of the suspension of her operating
privilege imposed by the defendant.347
The issue presented for review was whether the trial court erred in
finding that licensee had refused testing simply because she did not
want to leave her child with police while she had a blood test. 34' The
court held the suspension of licensee's driving privilege should be
reversed because defendant failed to meet its burden of proving
34

0See Brown v. Commonwealth Dep't. of Transp., 1999 WL 722966, at * I (Pa.

Commw.
Ct. Sept. 17, 1999).
34 1
See id.

342

See id.

343

See id.
See id.
345
See Brown, 1999 WL 722966, at * I.
34 6
See id.
347
See id.
344

34 8

See id. at *2.

2000]

CASE BRIEFS

licensee refused to submit to a blood test." 9 To sustain a license
suspension for refusal to submit to a blood test, the defendant has the
burden of establishing that the driver:
(1)

(2)
(3)
(4)

was arrested for drunken driving by a police officer
who had reasonable grounds to believe that the
motorist was operating, or actually controlling or
operating the movement of a motor vehicle, while
under the influence of alcohol,
was requested to submit to a chemical test,
refused to do so, and
was warned that refusal would result in a license
suspension.350

The court held the licensee assented to the test on two occasions
and only refused to leave child with strangers at the police stationY'
The court found no support for not allowing the reasonable request that
the child be allowed to accompany licensee to hospital. ' Therefore,
the court reversed the decision to suspend licensee's driving privilege
for one year.353
The concurrence noted that it would reverse the trial court on the
additional grounds that a mother has a right to determine whether it is
in the best interests of her child to be separated from her under these
circumstances.3 54 The licensee has a statutory duty to keep her child in
her care rather than leave the child in the care of strangers."' Common
sense and the United States Constitution demonstrate the state may not
interfere with the parent/child relationship unless compelling
circumstances are present.5 6 In this case, defendant provided no
34 9

See id

3

"See Brown, 1999 WL 722966, at *2 (citing Department of Transp. v. O'Connell, 555
A.2d 873
(Pa. 1989)).
35
1See id at *3.
352
See id
3 3

M See id

354

See id

355

See Brown, 1999 WL 722966, at *3.

356

See id. at *4.
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compelling reason why licensee had to be separated from her child in
order to undergo testing at the hospital. 57
The dissent stated that being separated from a child is the normal
and unavoidable consequence of being arrested. 3 8 The focus should
not be on leaving the child with strangers, but on the danger that
licensee was jeopardizing her child's safety by driving while
intoxicated. 359 Brown v. Commonwealth Dep't of Transp., 1999 WL
722966, at *1 (Pa.Commw. Ct. Sept. 17, 1999).

TORTS
Smoker's Injury Did Not Meet Requirement for RICO
and Fraud Action Against Tobacco Company
The United States District Court for the Northern District of Georgia
held a cigarette smoker could not proceed with cause of action without
establishing reliance and a causal connection between injury and
tobacco company. 6 °
Plaintiff alleged that his wife's death from metastatic oat cell
carcinoma was caused by years of smoking defendant's cigarettes.'61
Plaintiff brought a civil Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt
Organizations Act (RICO) and fraud action against defendant.'62 The
court noted that a RICO plaintiff must establish that her injuries were
proximately caused by the defendant's unlawful predicate acts. 6' In
order to state a prima facie case of fraud under Georgia law, plaintiff
was required to allege:

357

See id. at *5.

358

See id. at *6.

159See id.
36°See Huddleston v. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co., No. CIVAI:98-CV-1865-TWT, 1999
WL 739457,
at *1 (N.D. Ga. Sept. 16, 1999).
361
See id.
' 62See id.
363

See id. at *4.
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(1)
(2)
(3)
(4)

a false representation by defendant,
scienter,
an intention to induce the plaintiff to act or refrain from
action,
justifiable reliance by the plaintiff and

(5)

damages.364

The plaintiff alleged the defendants deliberately exposed his
spouse to a hazardous substance by concealing the dangerous health
impact of cigarettes in advertising and marketing campaigns."
Defendant cigarette manufacturer responded by filing a motion for
summary judgment.366
The court held the defendant's motion for summary judgment
should be granted because plaintiff failed to meet the requirements for a
civil RICO and fraud action.3 67 The court concluded the plaintiff did
not establish that his wife's injury flowed from one or more predicate
acts of the defendant.3 6s Specifically, the plaintiff provided no evidence
of a causal connection between his wife's lung cancer and the
defendant's cigarettes.169 The court held plaintiff failed to establish
reliance on the defendant's representations, a necessary element of a
fraud action.

The court noted the Federal Cigarette Labeling & Advertising Act
(the Labeling Act) pre-empted plaintiffs RICO and fraud claims
because the Eleventh Circuit held the Labeling Act was intended to
include common law claims.3 7 ' Plaintiff also would not be able to
succeed on his claim that defendants intentionally exposed his wife to a
hazardous substance because the claim is not a recognized tort in this

3

6See id at *5.
See Huddleston, 1999 WL 739457, at * 1.
366
See id
367See id
36
SSee id.
365

369

See id

370
See
371

Huddleston, 1999 WL 739457, at *5.
See id at *6-7.
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state.37 2

Huddleston v. RJ Reynolds Tobacco Co., No. CIVA1:98-CV1865-TW, 1999 WL 739457, at *1 (N.D. Ga. Sept. 16, 1999).

Patient May Sue for Personal Injury Resulting from
Sexual Abuse During Medical Examinations
The Court of Appeals of Minnesota denied defendant's motion for
summary judgment because lower court erred in finding plaintiff did
not have a cause of action for personal injury resulting from sexual
abuse during medical treatments.
The court did grant defendant's
motion to strike portions of plaintiff's brief since the briefs contained
information filed after the verdict and were not a part of the appellate
record.374
Patient testified that defendant physician used inappropriate sexual
conduct during physical examinations."' Expert testimony indicated
no medical reason for defendant to perform the examinations.376
Plaintiff presented evidence regarding prior disciplinary actions against
defendant physician for similar misconduct.37 7 Patient alleged that her
inability to trust as a result of the violations had impaired her
relationships.7
Defendant physician alleged no recognized cause of action for
personal injury caused by sexual abuse.3" Defendant asserted that if
such a cause existed, plaintiff would fall because she does not meet the
severe mental anguish standard for emotional damages as reported in
the criminal sexual conduct statute.380 Finally, defendant filed a motion
to strike portions of patient's brief and appendix and for attorney's fees
372See id. at *10.

373See Brett v. Watts, No. C5-99-492, 1999 WL 732249, at *I (Minn. Ct. App. Sept. 21,
1999).
374See id.

375See id.
376
See id.
37 7
See id.
37
'See Brett, 1999 WL 732249, at *2.
379
See id.
38 0
See id.
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associated with the motion."' The district court denied defendant's
motion for judgment on the pleadings, but entered summary judgment
against plaintiff's claims for sexual abuse." 2
On appeal, the court denied defendant's summary judgment
motion." 3 The court held the plaintiff had a cause of action because
personal injury is implicit in the act of sexual abuse? The court
concluded plaintiff did not have to show an elevated level of emotion to
proceed to trial. 385 The criminal statute's definition of sexual
misconduct required a plaintiff to demonstrate more significant
emotional damage than a civil plaintiff would have to allege." The
court noted that defendant misconstrued the criminal sexual assault
statute and applied it incorrectly to this civil action. "? Brett r. Watts,
No. C5-99-492, 1999 WL 732249, at *1 ('Minn. Ct. App. Sept. 21,
1999).

Public University Faculty Members Working
in Private Hospitals are Public Employees
for Purposes of Tort Claims Act
The Supreme Court of New Jersey held physicians who work as state
university faculty members in private hospitals are private employees
under the state Tort Claims Act.SS
In 1994, plaintiff underwent a thyroidectomy and a
mediastinoscopy.3 9 Following surgery, plaintiff was only able to speak
in a whisper.39 Follow-up treatment after surgery determined that in
381See &L
3 2

SSee id at *1.

3 3

See Brett, 1999 WL 732249, at *4.
SSee id.at *5.

3

3

SSSee id at *2.

36

S See id at *4.

3 7

S See id

3

sSSee Eagan v. Boyarsky, 731 A.2d 23,28 (N.J. 1999).

39

S See id at 29.

3 0

See d
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the course of the operation, plaintiffs recurrent laryngeal nerves were
severed, leading to bilateral vocal cord paralysis.391
The defendant physicians were both clinical professors employed
by the University of Medicine and Dentistry of New Jersey
(UIIMDNJ). 392 Both practiced medicine in a UMDNJ affiliated private
hospital. 393 Defendants' sole employment was with UMDNJ, and
defendants received their salary only from UMDNJ.39 4
Under the New Jersey Tort Claims Act, public employees were
entitled to notice of a claim.395 When plaintiff filed his malpractice suit,
he was not aware defendants were public employees, and he did not
provide notice.396 Defendants filed a motion to dismiss for failure to
provide notice, and the trial court granted that motion.397 The court of
appeals reversed that decision, finding the physicians were independent
contractors.398 Defendants appealed that decision.399
The court held defendants were public employees for purposes of
the Tort Claims Act because they were totally economically dependent
on UMDNJ and because their work constituted an integral part of
UMDNJ's business.4"'
The court further held plaintiff was entitled to file a late notice of
claim because he could not have known who defendants' employer
was, and he diligently pursued his claim by following procedures
necessary to claim medical malpractice against a physician under
ordinary circumstances. °" Eagan v. Boyarsky, 731 A.2d 28 (N.J.1999).

39 1

See id. at 30.

392See id.
"3 See Eagan, 731 A.2d at 30.

" 4See id.
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WORKERS' COMPENSATION
An Employee Paralyzed Due to a Work Related Injury
May Modify His Original Compensation Award
to Include a Wheelchair Accessible Vehicle
The Missouri Court of Appeals, Western District, held that a
wheelchair accessible van qualified as "medical treatment" and was
medically necessary under the workers' compensation la, but that the
employer did not have to provide for all costs involved with the
vehicle.0 2
Plaintiff, who worked for the defendant as a window washer,
suffered complete paralysis from a fall incurred while on the job." As
a result, he was wheelchair bound for the duration of his life!' Upon
his return to work in a different capacity than his previous position, he
found it increasingly difficult to maneuver himself and the wheelchair
in and out of vehicles." 5 Plaintiffs physician testified as an expert
witness that continued maneuvering of this kind in and out of the car,
which was not wheelchair accessible, was already causing plaintiff
physical stress on his lower back and torso, and would continue to pose
physical problems in the future. 6 The plaintiff requested that he be
given a vehicle with proper access for the disabled as an extension of
award, to which his current
his original workers' compensation
407
agree.
not
would
employer
The court posed a question whether Missouri's Worker's
Compensation law covers wheelchair accessible vehicles under the
rubric of medical treatment."S The court held that the purpose of such
statutes is to benefit those who are injured and, therefore, should be
40

See Mickey v. City Wide MainL, 996 S.W.2d 144, 144 (Mo. Ct. App. 1999).
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given a broad reading in terms of possible remedies.4"' The court
further held that it would be reasonable to interpret the language of the
4
statute to compensate plaintiff for any modifications to the van. 10
However, the court did clarify that its decision was fact specific and
that plaintiff would be responsible for expenses such as repair, gas,
title, license, and insurance costs.4 ' Mickey v. City Wide Maint., 996
S. W.2d 144 (Mo. Ct. App. 1999).
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41
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